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The Korea Fair Trade Commission have long stuck to law enforcement policy that Article 
19 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act which prohibits anticompetitive concerted 
practices applies to horizontal agreements only, while most anti-competitive vertical agreements 
have been judged by ‘the likelihood to impede fair trade’ standard under Article 23. This does 
not, however, have any statutory ground or antitrust policy justification. Such law enforcement 
approach to vertical restraints may make prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices under 
the MRFTA insufficient and cause unnecessary confusion in regulating unilateral conduct 
under the Act. 
Fortunately, the KFTC and courts which reviewed the KFTC’s decisions recently showed 
signs of changes where a non-horizontal agreement was in issue. However, this does not seem 
enough to change antitrust rules governing vertical restraints under the MRFTA in near 
future.  
A consistent and systematic approach is requested for establishing the clear distinction 
between concerted and unilateral conduct under the Korean antitrust law regime by restoring 
law enforcement against anti-competitive vertical agreements as an unreasonable concerted 
practice. In process of such development, of cause, a due respect should be paid to predictability 
on the side of business communities. 
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I. Introduction
A unique characteristic of the Korean antitrust law enforcement is 
heavy reliance upon prohibition on unfair trade practices under Article 23 
of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter ‘MRFTA’). The 
other side of the same coin is practically no antitrust law enforcement 
against vertical restraints as concerted conduct. No statutory basis for such 
enforcement policy can be found on the MRFTA or any other legislation as 
will be discussed later (II). However, the Korean competition authority, the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter KFTC) have long stuck to law 
enforcement policy that Article 19 of the MRFTA which prohibits 
anticompetitive concerted practices applies to horizontal agreements only, 
not vertical agreements. 
The agency has never officially publicized its view on applicability of 
Article 19 of the MRFTA to a vertical agreement and no other official 
explanation has been given for this long-lasting law enforcement practice. 
The widely accepted and plausible speculation is that such KFTC’s law 
enforcement policy was affected by law enforcement practice of its 
Japanese counterpart, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, which in turn 
affected by an early Tokyo High Court decision rendered in 1953.  
The main ground for the Japanese court’s ruling was a unique 
requirement of so-called ‘mutual restraint’ for being held unreasonable 
restraint of trade (anticompetitive agreements) under the Japanese 
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act. Nonetheless, the court decision has been 
widely criticized among Japanese antitrust law scholars and law enforcers 
within the Japan Fair Trade Commission. 
The lack of law enforcement against vertical restraints as concerted 
conduct may create substantial loopholes in the Korean antitrust law 
regime regarding anticompetitive concerted practices. The loopholes have 
been filled up in part by means of prohibition on unfair trade practices 
under Article 23 and other related clauses of the MRFTA. It seems that 
some anticompetitive vertical restraints which are supposed to be held an 
illegal concerted practice under other leading antitrust law regimes have 
been judged as an unfair trade practice under Article 23 or resale price 
maintenance under Article 29 if the MRFTA. Hence, the prohibition on 
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unfair trade practices under Article 23 of the MRFTA has born too heavy 
burden. 
A more serious problem is that the ‘unfairness’ criteria under the unfair 
trade practice provision of the MRFTA has not been clearly defined either 
through the KFTC’s enforcement practices or reviewing courts’ judicial 
precedents yet. herefore, an argument can be persuasively made that the 
current Korean antitrust law regime has not made clear distinction between 
concerted and unilateral conduct, and substantial number of 
anticompetitive concerted conduct cases have been judged by the vague 
‘unfairness’ concept which appears on the unfair trade practice clause 
(Article 23 of the MRFTA).   
In discussing the issue raised above, this paper will first show statutory 
frameworks for regulating anticompetitive concerted conduct (Article 19 of 
the MRFTA) and unfair trade practices (Article 23 of the MRFTA and 
others) on the MRFTA (II), and then review law enforcement activities 
performed by the KFTC so far against vertical restraints either as a 
concerted practice or a unfair trade practice (III). It will also review recent 
court decisions in non-horizontal cartel cases, which suggested applicability 
of Article 19 to anticompetitive agreements entered into among parties who 
are located on different level of distribution chain (IV). Finally, it will 
discuss the prospects for changes to law enforcement against vertical 
restraints under the Korean antitrust law regime and make some 
suggestions on the issue (V), and conclude (VI). 
II.  Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Cartel Behaviors 
and Unfair Trade Practices
The main antitrust legislation in the Korean legal system is the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act which was enacted in 1980. The 
Act was originally modeled after the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair 
Trade Act which was enacted in 1947 and amended in large part in 1953. 
The MRFTA has four main pillars, namely prohibition on abuse of market 
dominance (Article 3-2), restriction on mergers and acquisitions (Article 7), 
prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices (Article 19), and 
prohibition on unfair trade practices (Article 23). It is generally accepted 
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that Article 3-2 and Article 23 aim at unilateral conduct by an undertaking 
with a market dominant or at least relatively powerful market position, 
whereas Article 19 aims at anticompetitive agreements among two or more 
undertakings. 
In addition, Article 26 of the Act prohibits anticompetitive or other 
restrictive practices by trade associations and Article 29 restricts resale price 
maintenance. Resale price maintenance is defined in Article 2(6) and 
considered a type of unilateral conduct in shape, not concerted conduct 
under the MRFTA. 
Hence, regulation of unilateral conduct on the MRFTA consists of 
prohibition on abuse of a market dominant position under Article 3-2, and 
prohibition on unfair trade practices under Article 23, and lastly, restriction 
on resale price maintenance under Article 29. This multilateral scheme of 
regulating unilateral conduct on the MRFTA creates a great deal of debate 
in constructing the statutory provisions and designing enforcement policy 
on unilateral conduct under the Korean antitrust law regime. 
As compared with multilateral nature of regulating scheme of unilateral 
conduct, prohibition on anticompetitive concerted practices on the MRFTA 
is quite straightforward and relatively simple. Article 19(1) of the Act 
prohibits agreements among undertakings which unreasonably restrain 
competition. It says, “No undertaking shall enter into an agreement, by 
contract, arrangement, decision or any other means, to engage in any of the 
following acts which, in concert with other undertakings, unreasonably 
restrict competition or cause other undertakings to enter into such an 
agreement.” This does not require ‘mutual restraint’ of business activities of 
participants as required under Article 2(6) of the Japanese Antimonopoly 
and Fair Trade Act.   
From the language of Article 19(1) seen above, prohibition on 
unreasonable concerted practices on the MRFTA may be said to be quite 
similar to that under Section 2 of Sherman Act as well as Article 101 of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union in large part. In particular, 
no ground for requirement of mutual rivalry relationship among 
participants in the concerted practice is found on the concerted practice 
provision of any of those three antitrust law regimes. 
The two main provisions aimed at unilateral conduct on the MRFTA are 
prohibition on abuse of a market dominant position under Article 3-2 and 
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prohibition on unfair trade practices under Article 23 of the Act. The former 
obviously applies only to undertakings with a market dominant position. 
Also, criteria for judging its violation have been relatively clearly 
established since the Supreme Court in POSCO1) held that the 
‘unreasonableness’ requirement for finding abuse of market dominance 
means ant-competitiveness in essence. 
On the other hand, there is much less clarity with regard to the latter, 
which provides for prohibition on various types of unfair trade practices. 
Article 23(1) says, “No undertaking shall engage in any of the following 
acts which are likely to impede fair trade or cause other undertakings to 
engage in such an act” and lists seven types of unfair trade practices. Also, 
the Presidential Decree implementing the MRFTA lists detailed types of 
unfair trade practices corresponding to each type of unfair trade practice 
provided for by Article 23(1). The unfair trade practice clause on the 
MRFTA seems modeled after Article 2(9) of the Japanese Antimonopoly 
and Fair Trade Act as was before the latter was amended in 2009.
The prohibition on unfair trade practices under Article 23 is applicable 
also to an undertaking without a market dominant position, but still many 
types of the unfair trade practices are understood applicable only to an 
undertaking having a powerful market position or superior bargaining 
position. In turn, apparently there is an issue on how much powerful or 
superior the undertaking should be for the prohibition to apply. 
A much more debated issue is by what criteria to judge ‘the likelihood 
to impede fair trade’ as required for an act listed to be held an unfair trade 
practice under Article 23(1). The majority of scholars have opined that the 
concept of likelihood to impede fair trade on Article 23(1) is broad enough 
to include unfairness of competition measures and unfairness of transaction 
terms and conditions as well as anti-competitiveness. Nevertheless, there 
are a lot of issues yet to be resolved with regard to the concept of likelihood 
to impede fair trade on Article 23(1).2)
For example, how different the anti-competitiveness required to be an 
1) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du8626, Nov. 22, 2007 (S. Kor.). 
2) See Lee Ho young , dogjeomgyujebeob [monopoLy reguLation act] 278-282 
(Hongmoonsa 5th ed. 2015), for theories and court decisions on the meaning and judging 
criteria of likelihood to impede fair trade under Article 23(1). 
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unfair trade practice from that required to be held abuse of a market 
dominant position or an unreasonable concerted practice?  It is also unclear 
from law enforcement practices of the KFTC and court precedents which 
types of unfair trade practices should be judged by the anti-competitiveness 
criteria, which types should be by the unfairness of competition means 
criteria, and which types, if any, should be by the both. A more challenging 
issue is how to distinguish the ‘unfairness of transaction terms’ type unfair 
trade practices which become the target of law enforcement by the 
competition authority from pure civil disputes which are properly to be 
resolved through civil dispute resolution means, typically a civil lawsuit 
filed by the aggrieved party. Although courts as well as law enforcement 
officials in the KFTC have long struggled with those issues, lots of them are 
yet to be more fully discussed and resolved.   
III.  Law Enforcement Activities by the KFTC against 
Vertical Restraints 
The competition authority of Korea had limited its law enforcement 
activities against anticompetitive concerted practices under Article 19 of the 
MRFTA only to cases where an anticompetitive agreement was entered into 
among undertakings which were competing against one another 
(horizontal agreement cases) until quite recently from very early period in 
implementing the MRFTA. As already explained, such law enforcement 
policy is believed to come from that of the Japan Fair Trade Commission. 
The MRFTA which was enacted in 1980 was modeled after the Japanese 
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act as amended in 1953 in substantial part. 
Naturally, the early enforcement of the MRFTA was heavily affected by the 
law enforcement practice of the Japanese competition authority. The law 
enforcement activities against cartel behaviors by the KFTC were no 
exception. 
Initially, the Japanese competition authority had applied Article 2(6) 
which provides for unreasonable restraint of trade to an agreement among 
undertakings located on different levels in the chain of distribution (vertical 
agreement) as well as one among undertakings competing against each 
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other on the same level (horizontal agreement).3) However, an early Tokyo 
High Court decision brought a drastic change to such enforcement policy. 
The decision was about an anticompetitive distribution agreement between 
a newspaper publisher and newspaper distributors. The court held that the 
unreasonable restraint of trade under the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair 
Trade Act was capable of being committed only by undertakings in 
relationship of mutual rivalry, because the essence of unreasonable 
restraint of trade was setting up of mutual restraint on their business 
activities among the participating undertakings.4) It added that a vertical 
agreement among undertakings located on different distribution levels 
could not constitute unreasonable restraint of trade because it lacked 
‘mutual restraint’ as required on the language of Article 2(6) of the Japanese 
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act.5)
As seen above, the main ground for the Japanese court’s ruling was a 
unique requirement of so-called ‘mutual restraint’ which appears on the 
unreasonable restraint of trade (equivalent to anticompetitive agreements 
under other antitrust regimes) clause of the Japanese Antimonopoly and 
Fair Trade Act. In fact, Article 2(6) of the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair 
Trade Act defines unreasonable restraint of trade as “business activities, by 
which any enterprise, by contract, agreement or any other means 
irrespective of its name, in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict 
or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain or 
increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or 
counterparties, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial 
restraint of competition in any particular field of trade.”  
The court’s ruling, although not explicitly overruled, has been widely 
criticized among many Japanese scholars and law enforcers within the 
Japanese competition authority on various policy grounds from early on. In 
particular, the Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business 
3) See jouji atsuya (厚谷襄兒) et aL., annotated anti-monopoLy act (條解獨占禁止法) 57-59 
(Hongmoondang, 1997) (Japan), for the early enforcement practice against unreasonable 
restraint of trade and its change of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. 
4) Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 9, 1953, 4 Kosei toriHiKi iinKai 
sHinKetsusHu 145 (新聞販路協定事件 判決) (Japan).
5) Id. 
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Practices Under the Antimonopoly Act issued by the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission in 1991 provides, with regard to the requirement of mutual 
restraint which appears on Article 2(6), that the content of restrictions of 
business activities in this context does not have to be identical in all firms 
(for example, distributors and manufacturers), but is sufficient if the 
conduct restricts the business activities of each firm and is for the purpose 
of achieving a common purpose, such as the exclusion of any specific firm.
More importantly, the language of Article 19 of the MRFTA does not 
include the same or similar requirement as seen above. In fact, the 
requirement of mutual restraint which appears on Article 2(6) of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act is very unique and cannot be 
found in any other major antitrust law regimes against anti-competitive 
concerted practices including the Korean. From the competition policy 
perspective, it is hard to justify requiring mutual restraint for holding a 
concerted practice among undertakings anticompetitive and hence, a 
violation of antitrust law.
Therefore, neither statutory nor policy ground exists for limiting 
prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices under Article 19 of the 
MRFTA only to horizontal agreement cases. Nevertheless, the KFTC 
probably affected by law enforcement practices of the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission had applied Article 19 only to horizontal agreements until 
recently. To anticompetitive restraints of trade among undertakings located 
on different levels of distribution such as a manufacturer and dealers, the 
KFTC had instead applied Article 23 of the MRFTA dealing them as a type 
of unfair trade practice or Article 29 which prohibits resale price 
maintenance. 
Vertical restrictive trade practices including resale price maintenance, 
tying arrangements, exclusive dealings, and market divisions, have been 
judged by the likelihood to impede fair trade standard under Article 23(1) 
or similar standard under Article 29(1), rather than unreasonable anti-
competitiveness standard under Article 19(1). Since the likelihood to 
impede fair trade standard is less clear and inclusive of different policy 
goals as already discussed, the law enforcement against those types of 
restrictive trade practices has not been necessarily consistent in terms of 
judging criteria. 
Also, the distinction between concerted conduct and unilateral conduct 
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in antitrust law enforcement has been ignored as to those vertical restraints. 
Undertakings only on the one level of distribution chain (usually, the 
upstream market level) have been subject to law enforcement by the KFTC 
even when undertakings on both levels of distribution chain actively 
participated in the illegal anticompetitive practice. 
Since early 2000’s, the KFTC has showed signs of change in cartel cases 
where undertakings located on more than one levels of distribution chain 
are involved. Although it has never explicitly announced that a vertical 
agreement may also constitute unreasonable concerted conduct under 
Article 19 of the MRFTA, it has dealt undertakings located on the different 
level of distribution chain as cartel participants in a cartel case. The 
examples include School Uniform Cartel case,6) Trunked Radio System 
Device Bid-rigging case,7) and Film Distribution Cartel case.8) 
More recently, the KFTC became more willing to apply Article 19(1) to a 
vertical agreement in a series of cartel cases. In Digital Music Source Cartel 
case, it decided that an agreement on the price and other terms of the 
digital music source product among contents providers (CP) and on-line 
service providers (OSP) which were in vertical relationship on the 
distribution chain of digital music source constituted unreasonable 
concerted conduct under Article 19(1).9) Also in Cable TV System 
Operators’ Cartel case, it held that five major cable TV system operators 
who agreed to implement so-called ‘Cable Only policy’ on TV program 
providers violated Article 19(1) even though they were not competing 
against one another since their franchises (broadcasting coverage areas) 
were defined by government permission and had no overlaps with one 
another’s.10)  
Finally, in Antiemetic Cartel case, where a global pharmaceutical 
company holding drug patents entered into a so-called reverse payment 
agreement with a domestic generic drug manufacturer which alleged the 
6) KFTC Decision, 2001-82, May 31, 2001 (S. Kor.); KFTC Decision, 2001-83, June 7, 2001 
(S. Kor.). 
7) KFTC Decision, 2008-137, May 2, 2008 (S. Kor.).
8) KFTC Decision, 2008-168, June 10, 2008 (S. Kor.).
9) KFTC Decision, 2011-85, June 29, 2001 (S. Kor.).
10) KFTC Decision, 2011-153, Aug. 24, 2011 (S. Kor.). It should be noted that the cartel 
members in this case were neither in horizontal nor in vertical relationship with each other.
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patents were invalid, the KFTC first explicitly held that Article 19 applies to 
agreements among undertakings which are not in mutual rivalry 
relationship.11)
IV. Recent Court Decisions in Non-Horizontal Cartel Cases
The courts which reviewed decisions by the KFTC in cartel cases had 
had no opportunities to render a ruling on the issue of applicability of 
Article 19 to non-horizontal agreements until quite recently because the 
KFTC had long applied Article 19 only to horizontal agreements as seen 
above. The situation has changed since the KFTC came to apply Article 19 
to agreements among undertakings which were not necessarily in mutual 
rivalry. 
The first court decision ever found which dealt with this issue was Seoul 
High court’s decision rendered in Film Distribution Cartel case. Seoul High 
Court held that an undertaking which is not in horizontal relationship with 
other participants is also capable of engaging in an unreasonable concerted 
practice in violation of Article 19 of the MRFTA with other undertakings 
which are in horizontal relationship with one another.12) Also, in Digital 
Music Source Cartel case, Seoul High Court held that an agreement among 
undertakings in vertical relationship as well as in horizontal relationship 
can constitute an unreasonable concerted practice in the light of the 
language of Article 19(1) of the MRFTA.13)  
The long-awaited ruling of the Supreme Court of Korea on this issue 
was finally rendered in Cable TV System Operators’ Cartel case in the 
spring of year 2015. In this case, the Cable TV System Operators argued that 
they were not capable of engaging in an unreasonable concerted practice as 
a matter of law because their broadcasting coverage areas were not 
overlapped, and hence, they were not in horizontal rivalry relationship 
11) KFTC Decision, 2011-300, Dec. 23, 2011 (S. Kor.).
12) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2009Nu2483, Oct.7, 2009 (S. Kor.).
13) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2011Nu25717, July 11, 2012 (S. Kor.). See also Seoul 
High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu3028, Oct.11, 2012 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2011Nu32470, Sept.19, 2012 (S. Kor.).
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with one another. The Supreme Court of Korea, rejecting this argument, 
explicitly ruled that mutual rivalry relationship among cartel participants is 
not a requirement for finding an unreasonable concerted practice under 
Article 19(1) of the MRFTA. 
However, the Court did not elaborate upon the grounds for such ruling. 
In addition, it could be possibly argued that the Court did not specifically 
mention a ‘vertical’ agreement in the decision and it is still unclear if the 
Court meant to apply Article 19 of the MRFTA to a pure vertical agreement 
among undertakings on different levels of distribution chain such as a 
manufacturer and a dealer, where no plural undertakings on the same level 
of distribution chain are involved. 
 
V.  Prospect for Changes to Antitrust Rules governing 
Vertical Restrains in Korea
What will be the prospects for changes to law enforcement against 
vertical restraints under the Korean antitrust law regime? It would be 
unrealistic to expect a drastic change in near future. Most importantly, the 
law enforcers within the KFTC, as many government officials do, tend to 
follow the precedents and are reluctant to change their law enforcement 
practices. They have treated almost all of the vertical restraints such as 
refusals to deal, tying arrangements, exclusive dealings, and resale price 
fixing arrangements as unfair trade practices prohibited under Article 23 or 
Article 29, not as an unreasonable concerted practice under Article 19 for 
more than thirty years since the MRFTA came into effect in 1981. 
Those non-horizontal agreement cases to which the KFTC applied 
Article 19 could be regarded as rare exceptions to this general rule and 
some unique characteristics of the cases led the KFTC to make such 
exceptions in choosing the applicable prohibition provision on the MRFTA. 
For example, the participants did not have only vertical relationship with 
one another, but also horizontal rivalry relationship on each level of 
distribution in School Uniform Cartel case,14) Film Distribution Cartel 
14) KFTC Decision, 2001-82, May 31, 2001 (S. Kor.); KFTC Decision, 2001-83, June 7, 2001 
(S. Kor.). 
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case,15) and Digital Music Source Cartel case.16) In other words, plural 
undertakings which mutually competed participated in the cartel both on 
the upstream and on the downstream market. 
Also in Cable TV System Operators’ Cartel case,17) the participants 
seemed to be in fact potential competitors to one another, even though they 
were not in actual rivalry relationship. The five major Cable TV System 
Operators were active in merging or acquiring minor Cable TV Systems for 
enlarging their broadcasting coverage areas and may confront with one 
another on the nationwide multi-channel Pay-TV market in near future. 
Lastly, the parties to the reverse payment agreement in Antiemetic Cartel 
case18) were in actual rivalry relationship on the main Antiemetic product 
market with each other and additionally, they were in vertical relationship 
on the distribution chain of other pharmaceutical products. 
With such exceptions, the KFTC is more likely than not to stick to the 
past decision practices by applying Article 23 or Article 29 to most vertical 
restraints rather than Article 19 of the MRFTA regardless of the recent 
development of court decisions discussed above. Without changes to law 
enforcement policy of the KFTC, the role of courts in developing antitrust 
rules is very limited under the Korean antitrust law regime.  
The Korean courts have made a contribution to development of 
antitrust rules mainly through the appellate jurisdiction to review the law 
enforcing administrative decisions rendered by the KFTC. Although any 
victims allegedly injured by a violation of a prohibition provision on the 
MRFTA may file a law suit for damages with a civil court under Article 56 
of the Act as well as under Article 750 of the CIVIL CODE, only tens of civil 
damages suits have been filed so far. Moreover, almost all of those damages 
suits are so-called ‘follow-on suits’, which means that they were filed after 
the KFTC decision of finding a violation had been finalized. 
Therefore, changes to law enforcement policy of the KFTC is a 
prerequisite for establishing the clear distinction between concerted and 
15) KFTC Decision, 2008-168, June 10, 2008 (S. Kor.).
16) KFTC Decision, 2011-85, June 29, 2001 (S. Kor.).
17) KFTC Decision, 2011-153, Aug. 24, 2011 (S. Kor.). It should be noted that the cartel 
members in this case were neither in horizontal nor in vertical relationship with each other.
18) KFTC Decision, 2011-300, Dec. 23, 2011 (S. Kor.). 
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unilateral conduct under the Korean antitrust law regime by restoring law 
enforcement against anti-competitive vertical agreements as an 
unreasonable concerted practice under Article 19 of the MRFTA. The task 
of making changes to law enforcement policy is not easy in general. 
Moreover, changing the long-lasting law enforcement policy of competition 
authority which has long been relied upon by related business communities 
could be harder than amending the relevant antitrust statute itself.                  
In the process of making changes to law enforcement practices against 
vertical restraints by the KFTC, a due respect should be paid to predictability 
on the side of business communities even though no amendment to the 
MRFTA is needed. The first step should be pre-announcement of changes 
to law enforcement policy against vertical restraints. The next step could be 
revision of the ‘Guidelines for concerted practice review’ issued by the 
KFTC to include detailed reviewing criteria for vertical concerted practices. 
The current Guidelines for concerted practice review keeps silent as to 
applicability of Article 19 to vertical agreements.  
Lastly and most importantly, the KFTC should be clear and consistent 
in distinguishing concerted conduct from unilateral conduct in enforcing 
the MRFTA against vertical restraints. Also, the KFTC should stick to the 
anti-competitiveness standard in reviewing vertical concerted practices 
under Article 19 as compared to vertical unilateral conduct either as an 
unfair trade practice under Article 23 or resale price maintenance under 
Article 29.        
VI. Conclusion 
The problem of ignoring the distinction between concerted conduct and 
unilateral conduct has been pointed out with regard to the Korean antitrust 
law enforcement. So far, the KFTC has applied Article 19 of the MRFTA 
mainly to horizontal agreements, whereas most anticompetitive vertical 
agreements were judged by the likelihood to impede fair trade standard 
under Article 23. Such law enforcement policy was presumably affected by 
law enforcement practices against unreasonable restraints of trade under 
the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act by the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission. 
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This does not, however, have any statutory ground under the MRFTA 
nor antitrust policy justifications in general. Such law enforcement 
approach to vertical restraints may blur the fundamental distinction 
between concerted conduct and unilateral conduct, and thereby cause 
serious problems in antitrust law regulatory system under the MRFTA. It 
may make prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices insufficient and 
cause unnecessary confusion in regulating unilateral conduct under the 
MRFTA. 
This issue is also interwound with the multilateral regulatory scheme of 
unilateral conduct under the MRFTA. In particular, the unique nature of 
prohibition on unfair trade practices under Article 23 contributed to such 
skewed law enforcement practices. 
Fortunately, the KFTC and courts which reviewed its decisions recently 
showed signs of changes in cases where a non-horizontal agreement was in 
issue. Courts including the Supreme Court of Korea as well as the KFTC 
approved the applicability of Article 19 to agreements the parties to which 
are not in mutual rivalry relationship. However, this does not seem enough 
to change antitrust rules governing vertical restraints under the MRFTA in 
near future.  
A consistent and systematic approach is requested for establishing the 
clear distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct under the 
Korean antitrust law regime by restoring law enforcement against 
anticompetitive vertical agreements as an unreasonable concerted practice 
under Article 19 of the MRFTA. In process of such development, a due 
respect should be paid to predictability on the side of business communities. 
